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THE LEGALITY OF AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
IN VIET NAM: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
NEILL H. ALFORD, JR.*
WE are forcefully reminded, from time to time, of the presence in
Western tradition of an impulse for transcendence and perfection.
Goals thought to support a "right" order of humanity are religiously
pursued, while limits upon the means chosen to attain them are fre-
quently ignored. Our unique American experience has reinforced this
Western impulse and critics of United States policy in Viet Nam fear
that we are once again resorting to violence to force our concepts of an
ideal society upon others.'
There is an immediate need for examination of the assumptions
which support current American foreign policy. This examination will
be difficult. While our idealism often burgeons into the pursuit of
sentimental and perhaps unattainable goals in foreign affairs, this ide-
alism is essential to cement together the disparate elements of our
nation. Only recently have we become conscious of the degree of strain
within the United States and of the importance of idealism in keeping
the country from bursting asunder. It is futile to consider abandoning
idealism in the conduct of our foreign policy, because idealism is a
cultural trait too well seated to be excised without destruction of the
whole social organism.
Most critics of our policy in Viet Nam have spoken from a philoso-
phy as idealistic as that held by supporters of that policy. Both sides in
the debate appear to have in mind ideal societies; neither seems overly
disturbed by the means to attain them. Thus, the debate over legal
aspects of the United States policy in Viet Nam has been shunted off
to the side and ignored by all except law professors, lawyers and others
with an interest in international and constitutional law. It is fre-
quently said that law "has nothing to do" with the United States
action in Viet Nam or that the problem is simply too serious for legal
issues to be significant. This position involves assumptions about law
as erroneous as they are facile.
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Mr. Kennan,2 Messrs. Stillman and Pfaff8 and others speak of law
in terms of rules for resolving conflict between individuals or commu-
nities. Mr. Kennan, in particular, finds "the legalistic-moralistic" ap-
proach to international problems "the most serious fault of our past
policy formulation."4 He deplores efforts to force patterns of conflict
into legalistic categories. But these criticisms ignore the constitutive
functions of law. Legal processes are orderly means by which we agree
upon community goals and estimate the likelihood of their attainment.
More important, legal processes can build and strengthen institutions
such as the United Nations which encourage the diffraction of coercion
and its projection on a verbal level.
THE ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM
The assumptions underlying the positions of Messrs. Kennan, Still-
man and Pfaff may result in inattention to the State Department
Memorandum on Viet Nam. Yet the Memorandum is an official land-
mark. It develops in detail arguments based on self-defense and col-
lective self-defense, which received little official treatment in the de-
bates following the Cuban Quarantine of 1962. 6 An analysis of the
"legal response" to the "legally puzzling" "War of National Libera-
tion" will doubtless have an effect upon official thought in the United
States similar to the effect in the early 20th century of Clark's memo-
randum on protecting American citizens abroad7 and the response by
2. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 95-101 (1951).
3. E.g., STILLMAN AND PFAFF, POWER AND IMPOTENCE 28-30 (1966).
4. KENNAN, supra note 2, at 95.
5. The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Yiet-Nam, 54 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 474 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
6. Official or semi-official statements were made by Legal Adviser Chayes and then
Deputy Legal Adviser Meeker in the debates following the Cuban Quarantine of 1962.
See Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 DP'T STATE BULL. 763
(1962); Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 550 (1963); Remarlts, 1963
PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 10; and Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 Am. J,
INT'L L. 515 (1963). The official arguments then pivoted on collective action by virtue of
the resolution of October 23, 1962 by the Council of the Organization of American
States. Arguments based upon self-defense or collective self-defense were not then
pressed by these spokesmen, although energetically put forward by others. E.g., Malliton,
Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National and Collective Defense
Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 335 (1962). A glimmer of
the arguments advanced by the State Department officials in the debates following the
Quarantine still remains in the Memorandum of March 4, 1966, with reliance upon
action under Article IV of the SEATO Treaty. See Memorandum 480-81.
7. CLARK, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES (De-
partment of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14, Oct. 5, 1912; reprinted In
Department of State Publications, No. 5 1934).
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Secretary Hay to the Wilson memorandum on de facto blockades by
insurgents.8
The author of this comment is in general agreement with the points
made in this Memorandum in response to criticism of the legal grounds
for the policy of the United States in Viet Nam. But unfortunately the
Memorandum is responsive to attacks based upon an extremely narrow
conception of law. This, in turn, has caused the Memorandum to be
narrow in conception, to stress things that perhaps should not be
stressed, to de-emphasize things that probably should be emphasized.
Without an attempt fully to document the counter-attack to criticism
of United States policy in Viet Nam, which was well done in the Mem-
orandum and which will be done even more completely in other arti-
cles to be published in the near future," the major arguments of critics
of the United States policy in Viet Nam will be considered first with
observations on the State Department answers to these arguments.
Thereafter a somewhat broader approach than that adopted by the
State Department will be suggested.
Arguments by critics based upon customary international law and
upon Articles 51 and 2(4) of the United Nations Charter require de-
tailed attention because of uncertainties in general community policy
in these areas. To the extent, however, that the critics argue that South
Viet Nam is not a state, their position is wholly untenable.
It has been urged, for example, that South Viet Nam (the Republic
of Viet Nam) is not a state but an insurgent area resisting its de jure
government in Hanoi. It is unfortunate that the State Department
Memorandum does not take a more positive position on this point. The
Memorandum suggests that South Viet Nam might lack some of the
attributes of statehood, but that United States policy is still defensible
because it supports the demarcation line established in the Geneva
Accords of 1954 (though violated by North Viet Nam). 10
8. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INtERNATIONAL LAW SrruATiONs 79-83 (1902).
9. See Deutsch, The Legality of the United States Position in Viet Nam, 52 A.B.A.J.
486 (1966) and J. N. Moore 9: J. L. Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assis-
tance to the Republic of Viet Nam (unpublished manuscript).
10. The State Department Memorandum appears to take the position that the Ac-
cords are still viable, although the "systematic violation . . . by North Viet Nam justi-
fied South Viet Nam in suspending compliance with the provision controlling entry of
foreign military personnel and military equipment," and "there may be some question
whether South Viet Nam was bound by... [the] election provisions." Memorandum 483.
There were four interrelated documents-a cease-fire agreement for Laos, Cambodia
and Viet Nam and an unsigned "Final Declaration." These documents may be found in
SENATE COMMT. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89TH CoNG., 2D S~ss., BACaGROUND INFORMATION
RELATING TO SoumEAsr ASIA AND Vir N.A 36-39 (Comm. Print 1966). The legal status
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As pointed out in the Memorandum, sixty states have recognized
South Viet Nam (eight of these are de facto recognitions). The General
Assembly has, on two occasions, affirmed the qualifications of South
Viet Nam for admission to the United Nations. 1 In both instances the
Security Council failed to recommend admission because of the veto of
the Soviet Union.12 But the Soviet Union did not suggest as a reason
that South Viet Nam was not a state. Instead, the Soviet Union seemed
to assume state status.
South Viet Nam is a member of and is active in more of the special-
ized agencies of the United Nations than the Soviet Union. It has par-
ticipated in forty-eight international conferences.
Although South Viet Nam has relied on French and, currently,
United States military assistance, it maintains armed forces for de-
fensive purposes larger than those of most of the members of the
United Nations. While its government has relied upon United States
assistance in maintaining order, its governmental policies have been
to a substantial degree free from United States influence.
The only argument which might be offered against the state status
of South Viet Nam is based upon the Geneva Accords of 1954.18 It has
sometimes been assumed that these Accords require a single Viet-
namese state-but nothing in the Accords suggests more than an ex-
pectation that a vote would decide this issue, and no requirement was
included that the votes of both South and North Vietnamese be
counted together on this question.
Although the Memorandum seems to suggest that the United States
continues to regard parts of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as viable, it is
difficult to ascribe to this ambiguous and ill-conceived transaction a
force which would deprive a community of state status at any time in
the future if this community satisfies such requirements as other states
impose to determine state status. These requirements seem to be that
(1) the community have a reasonable probability of permanent iden-
of -the "Final Declaration" is quite equivocal and probably the deference to it now
shown springs from the will-o-the-wisp of popular elections mentioned in detail in the
declaration and casually in the cease-fire agreements. The provisional nature of those
Accords relating to Viet Nam, in view of the radical changes in conditions since their
dubious beginning, should be a basis for disregarding them altogether, although the
State Department may still value the demarcation line and several other provisions of
the Accords which it would desire respected.
11. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess. 1017 B(XI) (A/PV.663) (Feb. 28, 1957); U.N.
GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess. 1144 B(XI) (A/PV.709) (Oct. 25, 1957).
12. U.N. SEcuarr COUNCIL OFF. REc. (S/PV.790) (Sept. 9, 1957); U.N. SECUgrrY CoUN-
CIL OFF. REc. (S/PV.843) (Dec. 9, 1958).
13. See note 10 supra.
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tity; (2) that it have an organized government; (3) a defined territory;
and (4) sufficient independence to conduct its foreign relations.14 Other
requirements might be imposed in special contexts; but undoubtedly
other states share an expectation that South Viet Nam is a state.
Since arguments that South Viet Nam is not a state have no weight,
the main thrust of the critics' attack upon the United States policy has
been based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which pre-
serves members' rights to self-defense in cases of "armed attack." 15 The
provisions of Article 51 are ambiguous and were intentionally made
ambiguous to permit states to take shelter under the cover of their
collective or regional defense systems if the United Nations proved
impotent as a peace enforcement institution. Views also differ concern-
ing the precise limits of the customary doctrines of self-defense and
collective self-defense. This complicates the interpretation of Article
51.
One point does seem certain. No basis exists for assuming that all
defensive measures contemplated by Article 51 are keyed to "armed
attacks," or that an "armed attack," as contemplated by Article 51,
occurs only when missiles are launched or forces deployed and set in
motion against an adversary. Under conditions of modem military
action, an "armed attack" may be regarded as a process and not solely a
single hostile offensive event.
Another certain point is that Article 51 does not deprive non-mem-
bers of their right to self-defense. It is quite doubtful that the parties
to the Charter could impose disabilities or obligations upon non-
members. Members certainly could agree to act against non-members,
as they appear to have done in Article 2(6) of the Charter, or they
could impose conditions upon a non-member invoking the aid of
United Nations organs, as in Article 35(2) of the Charter. But it is not
accepted that parties to the Charter can impose any other restraints
upon the action of non-members. The State Department Memoran-
dum suggests international custom could be affected by the continued
14. See BRmRLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 122-24 (4th ed. 1949) where these requirements
are briefly and conveniently discussed.
15. Article 51:
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against a member of the organization
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.
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application of Charter provisions, and this custom could thus affect
the obligations of non-members--however, this proposition has re-
ceived no general acceptance.10
Thus, a non-member retains whatever rights of self-defense or collec-
tive self-defense it had prior to the Charter unless changes in interna-
tional custom have actually conditioned these "rights" in new ways.
Certainly a provision expressly relating to members in Article 51
should not be taken by inference to refer to non-members as well, and
especially not to deny to non-members rights of self-defense or collec-
tive self-defense which members retain despite the provisions of the
Article. Quite clearly, South Viet Nam can act to defend itself against
attacks by neighbors from the North.
The question remains of what restraints exist under the Charter
upon United States assistance. Records of Committees engaged in
preparatory work on Articles 51 and 2(4) indicate they intended to
retain the customary doctrine of self-defense for members without
requiring an "armed attack" as a precondition.' The supervisory struc-
ture-the institutions developed for community judgment in the Secu-
rity Council and General Assembly-could determine whether self-
defense or collective self-defense was properly invoked in any given
situation; and Article 51 was not expected to stand independently as
the only guideline for protective action. The State Department Memo-
randum describes its operation correctly as a "saving clause."' s There
is an additional requirement that the defensive measures be reported
to the Security Council and there is also implied recognition of "col-
lective self-defense" arrangements that might not be regional arrange-
ments as described in Chapter VIII.
At the time of Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conference,
an "armed attack" was generally understood as a process by which a
state sought the initiative by a violent exercise of physical power.
Survival of an adversary under such an attack required ability on the
part of the adversary to strike at the source of power of the attacker.
A passive defensive posture had proven utterly futile in World War
II. But a counterstrike of the type required might violate Article 2(4)
16. See Memorandum 476 n.3 for support of the proposition that "it seems entirely
appropriate to appraise the actions of South Viet-Nam in relation to the legal standards
set forth in the United Nations Charter."
17. 12 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Does. 68-82; Report of Committee I to Commission I,
6 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Does. 446, 459; Verbatim Minutes of Fifth Meeting of Commis.
sion 1, 6 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Does. 202, 204.
18. Memorandum 475.
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and would certainly serve as a link in the chain of escalation of vio-
lence which the Security Council was designed to break.
The draftsmen of Article 51 probably intended to limit only the
armed counterstrike which would otherwise be in violation of Article
2(4) and in no way to preclude other exercises of power, even though
by military force, consistent with Article 2(4). In order for any organi-
zation, such as the United Nations, to perform its security functions,
member states would certainly have to enjoy rights of self-defense and
collective self-defense as broad as those of non-members.
The United States action in Viet Nam is directed principally to the
preservation of order in South Viet Nam. No recognized spokesman
for South Viet Nam has contended that the territorial integrity or
political independence of South Viet Nam has been violated by the
United States. The air raids against supply routes and training instal-
lations in North Viet Nam are in direct support of the South Viet Nam
operations. No one has ever contended that either the United States
or South Viet Nam has aspirations affecting the territorial integrity
and political independence of North Viet Nam. The United States
simply acts to frustrate an escalating aggression by North Viet Nam,
which conflicts with the principles stated in Article 2 of the Charter.
The United Nations, however, is not prepared to act to counter this
aggression under Article 2(6), because of the Soviet veto in the Secu-
rity Council and the difficulty of organizing action in the General
Assembly where the United States lacks the backing of major Western
powers who find the anti-Western features of the Vietnamese war an
embarrassment in their relations with their former colonies.
Just as Article 51 of the Charter does not preclude a broad spectrum
of military action so long as this action is consistent with Article 2(4),
the Charter does not limit a member's participation in collective de-
fense arrangements to "members of the club." The "regional arrange-
ments," for example, seem clearly to embrace the participation of
non-members:-indeed, like membership in the specialized agencies,
participation in regional security arrangements provides an opportu-
nity for contributions by non-members to world security when their
membership is denied for reasons unrelated to the qualifications ex-
pressed in Article 4 of the Charter.
It should be observed also that there are two opportunities for col-
lective defense in addition to the commitments undertaken by mem-
bers to support action by the United Nations. These are the Regional
Arrangements under Article VIII and "collective defense arrange-
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ments" implied under Article 51.19 If there is any requirement of
territorial contiguity and cultural identity for Regional Arrangements,
the United States has territory in the area of SEATO and a substan-
tial cultural identity with the people of that area. Obviously it has
security interests in common with SEATO members and areas brought
within the protection of SEATO that will support a "collective de-
fense agreement" with South Viet Nam under Article 51.
When critics of the United States action feel they cannot prevail by
arbitrary and unnecessarily restrictive interpretations of Article 51,
they then contend that the action the United States pursues in South
Viet Nam is not permitted by international legal custom. The basis of
this contention is an erroneous assumption of fact-that the strife in
South Viet Nam is internal (or was internal until the United States
commenced its assistance). There are at least three revolutions going
on in South Viet Nam. George A. Carver has recently analyzed two of
them:20 (1) a battle for power betveen a French-educated, foreign-
oriented class and a militantly "Vietnamese" group-by which the
United States periodically finds its military efforts embarrassed-
basically a social revolution; and (2) a North Vietnamese directed in-
surgency-which is the one the United States aids in suppressing.
There is a third, an anti-Western revolution, currently almost dormant
in South Viet Nam, but which will certainly flare up to complicate
relations between the United States and Afro-Asians in the future.
But even assuming that the strife in South Viet Nam was indige-
nous, which it does not appear to be, there seems little in international
legal custom which would preclude the United States from acting in
conjunction with a friendly government to maintain internal order.
The publicists are divided on the point, most taking the position that
the government can be assisted.
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
The legal critics of American involvement in Viet Nam have ne-
glected the broader functions of law. Regrettably the Memorandum,
by attempting to meet the legal critics of American involvement head-
on, have adopted their narrow perspective and neglected the broader
functions of law. Why should we discuss the conflict in Viet Nam in
terms of a "who did it first" analysis? That approach was meaningful
to the Justices in Eyre of Edward I when dealing with a fracas between
19. The distinction between these possible defensive arrangements is clearly made In
McDevitt, The U.N. Charter and the Cuban Quarantine, 72 JAG J. 71 (1963).
20. Carver, The Faceless Viet Cong, 44 FOREIGN AFFAi2s 347 (1966).
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peasants, and helps us to analyze problems which can be solved by
shifting wealth from one person to another. But the values involved
in Viet Nam cannot be converted into cash equivalents. Stability must
be attained in South Viet Nam so that the South Vietnamese may
manage their affairs without chronic violence. Yet who wins the war
in Viet Nam may have little to do with the establishment of a viable
system of world order; while how and what we and others think about
our uses of power there will have a lot to do with it. Law has an
important, although not exclusive, role in defining attainable goals,
shaping how we think about power and other values, coordinating
action to attain goals, and emphasizing the use of persuasion rather
than violence to alter or satisfy demands. The "conflict resolving"
features of law are least relevant to the war in Viet Nam.
The Memorandum does not clarify what the policies of the United
States may be, beyond "pushing out an invader who has attacked."
This hugs rather closely the formula of Article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter.
One can conceive of other possible policies which support our ac-
tion. Red China is being excluded, at least temporarily, from the "rice
bowl of Asia"; Red Chinese armies cannot turn against Europe or the
rest of Asia without added food supplies, even assuming these troops
can "live off the land" more effectively than Western armies. Thanks
to effective action in Viet Nam, Japan need not look for markets in a
wholly communized Asia-with the shift in political perspective this
would entail. And the American stand in Viet Nam is a major reason
why the Indonesian military was prepared to resist a communist coup.
The problems of South Viet Nam are, in microcosm, those of the
underveloped world. Western ideas-democracy and communism-
clash in the minds of people whose cultures have been sapped by the
intellectual imperialism of the West. It may therefore also be a United
States policy to seek answers or palliatives to the problems of the South
Vietnamese which have broader applications.2'
Whether or not such policy goals exist is unclear. Apart from "push-
ing out the invader," the goal which the Memorandum stresses, empha-
sis has been given lately to insuring "self-determination" by the South
Vietnamese. Critics of United States policy quote different scripture
for their faith in self-determination-either Wilsonian rhetoric, Bud-
dhist demands for a referendum, or the ill-considered and obsolete
21. See Lansdale, Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?, 43 FopWJc.v AFFAWIS 75
(1964) which stresses the need for imaginative civilian action, to create conditions favor-
able to a "true" (non-Communist) Vietnamese revolutionary cause.
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provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords-but all consider self-determi-
nation (translated as determination by ballot) basic to a "decently
ordered" society. Their demands have been accommodated in United
States policy statements. American action is portrayed as an effort to
secure self-determination for a harassed people, who otherwise would
be denied its blessings.
Unfortunately, no significant vote can be taken outside the urban
areas of South Viet Nam, and the countryside, containing a popular
majority, is controlled at least intermittently by the Viet Cong. A vote
there, until Viet Cong control is broken, would be as unreliable a
statement of opinion as the one-candidate elections of "people's democ-
racies." To uproot the Viet Cong, the United States thus stumbles onto
a platform of "enfranchisement by bombardment"-repellent to all
who think about it.
The Memorandum reflects some of this emphasis on an expression
of free will in South Viet Nam by relying heavily upon the continuing
consent of the "Government of South Viet Nam" to our assistance.
This stems in turn from the "who did it first" analysis we observed
earlier. But this concession encourages the assumption that if some
group claiming governmental status in Viet Nam-perhaps containing
members of regimes with which we have previously dealt-asked the
United States to leave, we would fold our tents and steal away. The
matter is not so simple.
If we were asked to leave, we would first have to determine whether
the government making the request expressed the wishes of so many
South Vietnamese that our continued presence would exacerbate fric-
tion rather than promote eventual stability. Critics have argued that
the present South Vietnamese government is unrepresentative. This
contention is based upon factual allegations that simply cannot be
determined with any accuracy until stability is restored.
In any event, withdrawal is not a subject for unilateral action by
the United States. Several of our SEATO allies have forces in Viet
Nam. Approximately 40,000 South Korean troops are there now. Al-
though a decision by the United States to withdraw would cause our
allied participants to withdraw also, joint participation would seem to
necessitate joint consultation, and great deference to the wishes of
states with immediate security interests in the outcome of the war.
South Viet Nam is not "estopped" from requesting us to leave, but
our military involvement there has reshaped our strategic posture. Our
power to strike is more flexible than our ability to remove military
resources from an area of active operations. The claims of South Viet-
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namese who did not wish to live under a communist regime must also
receive consideration. What provision would the United States make
for them?
In short, an official request for withdrawal, even if backed by unveri-
fied claims of widespread South Vietnamese support, should not neces-
sarily result in cessation of United States military action or the delivery
of all or part of South Viet Nam to communist control. Issues are in-
volved which extend far beyond simply clearing South Viet Nam of
Northern troops and Northern-sponsored insurgents. Possible alterna-
tives might include support of a basically anti-communist South Viet-
namese government in a loose federation along the lines of the former
French administrative subdivisions. Or the United States might seek
direct international control of the area-a regime similar to a United
Nations trusteeship. The various proposals for "neutralization" of
South Viet Nam might be compatible with such a regime. Otherwise,
we would probably have to strengthen United States forces in South
Viet Nam to prop up a wavering government and achieve whatever
policies United States officials now have in view.
Apart from the difficulties invited by the Memorandum's emphasis
on a continuing request for assistance, its frequent mention of an
"armed attack" upon South Viet Nam bogs us down in a sterile dispute
concerning unverifiable factual details. Those with information about
the nature and scope of communist subversive military operations will
recognize the Administration's basic statements of fact as correct.Y
There is, however, a "credibility gap," and many intelligent and in-
fluential persons have not, and will not, accept in detail the facts of-
fered by the Administration. Thus by emphasizing an "armed attack"
as the universal solvent of the "legality" of United States assistance, the
State Department permits critics of our policy to play upon the factual
doubts of the American public. Indeed, the failure to link United
States policy-making with a consistent effort to encourage and support
decision-making by the general community concerning Viet Nam al-
lows critics to portray United States policy as essentially destructive
of international order, whereas in fact the United States policy con-
sistently supports that order. This failure stems from neglect of the
constitutive function of law.
22. Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Con-
quer South Viet-Nam, 52 DEs'T STATE BuLL. 404 (1965), appearing also in SENATE Co.s4.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89iH CONG., 2D SEss., BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIEr NAm 171 (Comm. Print 1966) (less photos, maps and appen-
dices); Carver, supra note 20, which contains an excellent and apparently highly accurate
statement of the degree of North Vietnamese control over the Viet Cong.
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There is too little emphasis in the Memorandum, apart from the
concentration upon Article 51, of the relationship of the United States
action in Viet Nam to the shifting functions of the United Nations.
The State Department's comments on this relationship reflect much of
the Memorandum's philosophy: 23
... The conclusion is clear that the United States has in no way
acted to interfere with United Nations consideration of the con-
flict in Viet Nam. On the contrary, the United States has re-
quested United Nations consideration, and the Council has not
seen fit to act....
The United States' legal case would be stronger had we not confined
ourselves to filing the required reports with the Security Council but
had pressed more vigorously for United Nations participation. The
United Nations position, as described by Secretary General U Thant,
has been that the United Nations can do nothing because North Viet
Nam and Red China will not appear before it.24
An advocate supporting United States policy might urge that the
effective, although not formally stated, functions of the United Nations
are in process of change; that membership in that Organization has
never precluded all uses of force by members except in cases of armed
attack, and that the power relationship of the United States to the
United Nations Organization shifts with the functions of that Organi-
zation and the interrelationships of its members, particularly the more
recent ones.
Despite the several provisions in the Charter for peace supervision
and enforcement, the major function of the United Nations in the
past decade has been "rheostatic" activity-the diffraction of coercive
features of policy exchanges and the projection of these upon a verbal
level in which persuasive features can dominate. The power of the
United States, and of other countries with an interest in both stability
and moderately paced change, may be utilized effectively by furnish-
ing "interim sustaining action" until those rheostatic functions can be
activated. In Viet Nam the interim sustaining military operations of
the United States have been protracted because the two Asian aggres-
sors involved are unwilling to appear before the United Nations to
have their operations exposed to the view and judgment of the general
community.
This is not to suggest that the United States has any "policing"
functions in the general community. To suggest a broad mission such
23. Memorandum 479.
24. New York Times, April 7, 1966, p. 13, col. 1,
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as this, or a mission to make the world safe for "democracy," "diver-
sity," ".experiment" or any other reflection of an American way of life
to be established for others, might be to encourage the "arrogance of
power" which we all seek to avoid. But states having the power to sup-
port a viable world order of which most of the people of the world
approve should shape their policies to support the institutions by
which this order can be maintained-in this case the various organs
of the United Nations concerned with peacekeeping. The United
States action in Viet Nam, when viewed as "interim sustaining action"
pending mobilization of more extensive efforts, military and otherw~ise,
by the general community, should not depend for its legitimacy upon
the well-documented "armed attack" by North Viet Nam. A threat to
the peace is involved which ultimately will require action by the gen-
eral community, and interim action by the United States is an indis-
pensable prerequisite to an effective international solution.
